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Introduction 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) annually 
publishes a study on the economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean. The latest 
edition of this study (ECLAC, 2015) reveals that there has been a slight growth of fiscal revenues1
This is cause for concern because of the relative importance of the natural resources sector to 
the region; Latin American states still rely heavily on the exports of natural resources for successful 
integration in the global economy (Singh, 2013; ECLAC, 2015). The appropriation and efficient 
investment of resource rents from natural resources is an important determinant of development in 
these countries, where the resource extraction industry (REI) is of such importance.   
 as a 
percentage of the GDP in Latin-American states. However, the study also shows that this growth is 
threatened by the weakness in revenue from non-renewable natural resources.  
Important international organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), G20 and International Monetary Fund (IMF) are advising developing 
countries to increase their tax collection (Von Haldenwang, 2011).   
The relatively low international mining prices during the 1992s 2  led Latin American 
governments to believe that mining would not be a significant source of fiscal revenue. Mining was 
generally seen as an instrument to bring variety to the types of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI, and to 
achieve a more geographically balanced growth-pattern. This led to governments in the region 
establishing very attractive fiscal regimes, 3
Mineral commodities prices have risen significantly in the past decade —mineral prices grew by 
over 300% since 2003 (NSI, 2013)— which led to growth in the mining sector of the region of Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAC). However, host-governments have not been able to benefit equally 
from the rise in mineral prices. Old regressive fiscal regimes in the region partially explain why host-
 or fiscal agreements with private firms, in order to 
incentivize FDI. However attractive for private firms, the lenient fiscal regimes led to an imbalance in 
the division of the resource rents between host-governments and private firms. 
                                                                    
1 Fiscal revenue is the total state-income through taxation.  
2 For example: gold and silver were approximately US$ 10,500 and US$ 175 per kilogram during the 1990s, while in 
2012 they were respectively US$ 41,200 and US$ 1,100 (NSI, 2013).  
3 A fiscal regime, in this document, refers to a broad variety of tax and contractual arrangements, including signature 
bonus payments, royalties, income tax, production-sharing, resource-rent taxes, and state participation, among 
others (IMF, 2012b).  
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governments —in large part— were not able to capture the revenues from the increasing commodity 
prices. Another explanation is that the fiscal administration is often difficult and badly executed.  
The IMF (2012) comments that the, often excessive, variety and complexity of REI fiscal 
regimes have often posed serious challenges to developing states; important tax rules have often been 
complex, unclear, or open to abuse. This has led to inefficient taxation, which is reasserted by the 
ECLAC’s research as indicated earlier, showing weakness in revenue from renewable resource sectors.  
Developing a successful national policy for the development of a strategic mineral involves 
many considerations. When it comes to public policies there is more to consider than just the national 
economy; there are often environmental issues related to mineral-exploitation, and local communities 
affected by the mining industry. A measurement of success thus depends on the definition thereof. 
Success might be measured in the sustainable growth of an industry, exports, contribution to the 
national GDP, or it might include socio-economic development, collected revenue, or locally adding 
value to the industry. 
With regard to the national economy, there are long-term policies and short-term policies, 
respectively focusing on industry development and maximal rent extraction, for example. Long-term 
policies might also benefit intergeneration-equality.  
Either way, it is important to develop a policy that is broadly supported by a country’s 
citizens, and fairly shares in the economic resource rent. A country can chose to develop its own 
resource extraction companies, but this often involves a high level of expertise, and high levels of 
investment. Another way is through taxing private firms that extract minerals or resources. A solid 
fiscal regime, for a great deal, depends on effective institutions.  
These issues are explored in this report, with analyses of public policies that stimulate, or 
facilitate, national economic growth, through sharing the economic resource rent. The public policies 
regarding issues of environmental damage, or local communities affected by mining projects —although 
equally important— are not emphasized in this report. They will however be briefly addressed in this 
document, with regard to the policy proposal of the Chilean National Lithium Commission.  
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I. The lithium industry 
States in the LAC region are home to some of the world’s most extensive mineral reserves, with great 
reserves of copper, iron, silver, and tin. Another non-renewable resource that is gaining salience is 
lithium.  The lithium-industry has a significant growth-potential, due to the application of lithium in 
Li-ion batteries. Li-on batteries are widely used for various forms of energy-storage, from smart-grid 
systems to batteries for electronic vehicles.  
The furthering of the non-fossil fuel-dependent automotive industry would be welcome in 
highly urbanized Latin America, where air pollution is a critical issue, and where motor vehicle 
density is escalating (ECLAC, 2014). The LAC region contains approximately 65% of the global 
lithium resources (COCHILCO, 2014; SERNAGEOMIN, 2014b; ECLAC, 2014).  
The three states with the highest amount of available lithium resources are Bolivia, Chile, and 
Argentina, see Appendix 1 for a representation of what is known as the lithium triangle. Of the three, 
only Chile and Argentina are significant lithium producers. Bolivia is in the process of developing its 
lithium-industry. 
Chile, one of the biggest lithium producers in the world, is the only state that has classified 
lithium as a non-concessible strategic mineral of national interest. This means that lithium is linked to 
the national interest, and can therefore only be exploited by the state (COCHILCO, 2014). There are, 
however, two mining firms that were granted lithium-concessions either before the metal was declared 
strategic, or through a Chilean state institution. These two mining firms are the only lithium producers 
in Chile at the moment. 
In June of 2014, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet and Aurora Williams —the current 
Mining Minister of Chile— created a Ministerial Advisory Committee; the National Lithium 
Commission (NLC). The NLC is tasked with proposing a new national policy on lithium governance. 
The national policy on lithium governance is concerned with the sustainable development of the 
lithium industry, by addressing social, economic, and environmental issues. The NLC has met with 
stakeholders, experts, lithium producing companies, and other relevant parties, in order to evaluate the 
Chilean and global perspective of lithium exploitation.  The final goal is to improve the current 
concession system to stimulate the exploration and exploitation of lithium while making it easier for 
new actors to enter the market (Mining Lithium, June 2013). The ECLAC has been asked to 
participate in this commission to contribute through expertise on natural resource governance. The 
NLC has presented its lithium policy proposal to the Chilean government in January 2015. 
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A. Objective and structure of the report 
The objectives of this report are twofold:  The first objective is to provide an integrated overview of 
the governance of strategic minerals, focused on sharing the economic-resource rent.  The second 
objective is to provide a context for the policy proposal of the NLC. The collected data, and 
information, on the various fiscal regimes can be used as a reference for further research. Further 
research might deepen the insight into revenue collection, and the use of those revenues to stimulate 
development, for example.  
The objectives in this report are met by analyzing distinct aspects of strategic mineral 
governance, in three different parts. The lithium-industry serves as a case study for this report, as an 
example of a strategic mineral.  
The first part analyses various resource governance issues. One essential element of lithium 
governance, and strategic mineral governance in general, is the encompassing fiscal regime. Effective 
tax-instruments are key in translating resource rents into governmental revenue. This element has not 
yet been thoroughly addressed in the NLC policy proposal, and will therefore be developed by the 
Chilean government in the months to come. This report explores the current issues relating to the 
taxation of the Resource Extraction Industry (REI)  
This section discusses: the various forms in which a state can collect revenue from the REI; 
the changing bargaining-positions between governments and private firms when establishing a fiscal 
regime; and the issue of transparency, with a discussion on the potential benefits of transparency in 
fiscal regimes, and the potential detriments of its obscurity.  
This report emphasizes the need for transparency of fiscal regimes with regard to the visibility 
of collected revenues, and fiscal agreements between governments and private firms. Unfortunately it 
has been too difficult —in the limited scope and timeframe of this report— to obtain dependable data 
on collected revenue from the lithium industries in the analyzed states.4 This is an indication of the 
obscure nature of fiscal regimes on mining.5
The second part starts with an introduction to lithium, and the global lithium industry. This 
includes a mapping out of the global distribution of lithium resources, the global demand, and the 
active producers. The international benchmarking presents a brief examination of lithium industries in 
the major lithium-producing states: Australia and China.
 Because the data on collected revenue from lithium-
producers is this difficult to obtain, it is equally difficult to demonstrate a local lithium industry’s 
contribution to the national GDP, and to the economic growth of a state. This is problematic because it 
hinders transparency, and might decrease legitimacy. 
6
                                                                    
4  None of the institutions that promote mineral revenue disclosure (EITI; IMF; World Bank; ICTD) have any data on 
collected revenue from the lithium industry at the moment of writing. As a consequence hereof, this report 
occasionally relies on data from other sources, dating from 2013 and earlier. Most of the data has not been updated 
annually. Analysts at COCHILCO and Geoscience Australia confirm that production figures aren’t regularly 
updated anymore, due to the decreasing transparency of the global lithium market. For example: Talison Lithium 
does not rapport annual production of spodumene concentrates anymore, since it was acquired by the Chinese 
Tianqui, Galaxy Resources hasn’t published any figures either.  
 These international benchmarks are 
5  NB: The export of lithium or LCE is a relatively small market, meaning that the publicly published information by 
governments on lithium production and revenue is often aggregated with other minerals. This partially explains 
why these figures are difficult to obtain. Another reason for the unavailability of revenue data is because of privacy-
laws. In Australia, for example, the government is not allowed to disclose any information on paid taxes through 
which taxpayers can be identified. Furthermore, the lithium producers who have responded to the author’s inquiries 
mentioned that they consider their values of production as commercially confidential.  
6  The USA also holds, and produces, a significant amount of lithium. The figures on production, reserves, and 
resource availability have all been classified.  There is only one active commercial lithium brine operation in the 
USA Rockwood Lithium, located in Silver Peak, Nevada. They report their annual lithium production to the USGS, 
but Rockwood Lithium has always requested that the USGS do not publish their proprietary production data. As 
they are the only domestic lithium operation, the USGS is obligated to carry out their instructions. For these reasons 
the lithium industry in the USA will not be included in this analysis. 
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followed by a regional analysis of lithium in Latin America, with profiles on Argentina and Bolivia. 
Bolivia contains the largest share of the world’s lithium resources 7
This framework of the lithium industry lays out the context for the analysis of the Chilean 
lithium industry, in the third part of this report. The analysis of Chile’s lithium industry concludes 
with a summary of the national lithium policy, as proposed by the NLC. The report concludes with a 
synopsis and analysis of the history of lithium-policy and the encompassing legal-framework in Chile. 
Chile’s classification of lithium as a strategic mineral has made for a complicated situation of 
conflicting legislation. 
, but is not yet producing 
significantly. Bolivia is, however, developing its local lithium-industry through a joint-project with the 
Netherlands. These countries are profiled for their lithium-production, lithium-availability, and 
obtainable fiscal regulations for lithium mining.  
Figure 1 




In order to arrive at dependable and unbiased conclusions, the authors conducted a series of 
interviews, used various sources of information such as; newspapers; published academic articles; and 
studies from; intergovernmental organizations, mining enterprises, governmental scientific agencies, 
and international economic organizations. The potential bias of each source has been taken into 
account by the authors.  
                                                                    
7  Bolivia contains approximately 24,4% of the global lithium resources (COCHILCO, 2013: 3-14; SERNAGEOMIN, 
2014b).  
Theoretic framework: sharing the economic 
resource rent 
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II. Sharing the economic resource rent 
A. The resource extraction industry 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean deems good 
governance of natural resource sectors essential for socio-economic development. The ECLAC 
defines good governance as:  
“(…) the effective capacity of the State to take the political action needed to ensure that 
natural resources are exploited in a away that contributes effectively to inclusive economic 
development, generating production linkages with the rest of the domestic economy, driving 
the development of appropriate infrastructure to avoid enclaves of natural resource-based 
exports and combining the growth of these sectors with safeguards for the environment and 
the rights of the peoples and communities, among other goals” (ECLAC, 2014). 
The ECLAC recommends resource rich countries that extraction of those natural resources 
should be combined with progress towards a more diversified production structure, promoting 
technological innovation and linkages with other sectors in the stage development of the natural 
resource sector. The other stage represents efficient government investment of natural resource rents 
and the proper use of the associated tax revenues; by creating employment opportunities, 
infrastructure, social protection, building human capacities and investing in education and training. 
This should sustain societies with greater equality and opportunities for development, as concluded by 
the ECLAC: “The ultimate objective is to leave future generations the production capacities and 
means to achieve sustainable development” (ECLAC, 2014). 
Thus, dealing with governance of strategic minerals, and non-renewable natural resources in 
general, there are a lot of political and legal matters involved with resource governance. In the end, 
from the perspective of state-development, resource governance should contribute to economic growth 
and security. This chapter explores the current issues on resource governance, and how a state can 
benefit from the exploitation of these natural resources.  
Most states own the non-renewable natural resources within their continental and oceanic 
territory, on behalf of its citizens. These resources are usually —though not exclusively— explored 
and exploited by private firms. These exploitation projects have the capacity to generate surplus 
CEPAL Governance of strategic minerals in Latin America… 
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revenues in excess of all costs of production; economic resource rents.8
A state often treats the REI differently than other economic activity, because of its unique 
characteristics. One motive for the special treatment of the REI is that a host-government wants to be 
compensated for the declining stock of finite resources due to its exploitation. As many resource-rich 
governments own all its subsoil assets, companies are often required to pay a fee —in the form of a 
royalty— for the right to exploit the state-owned deposits. Royalties are used as an addition to taxes 
on all business operations. 
 Governments of resource-rich 
states aim to obtain a fair share of the resource rents emanating from mining projects, and citizens may 
thus reasonably expect that this would benefit local socio-economic development. However, there is 
no automatic positive link between resource extraction (RE) and socio-economic development 
(ECLAC, 2013: 271). Many developing resource-rich states do not have the financial resources, or the 
expertise, to explore for and develop mineral resources (NSI, 2013). The exploration and exploitation 
of minerals in developing states therefore generally relies on foreign investment. One significant 
determinant for a positive relation between RE and socio-economic development is an effective fiscal 
regime, through which REI revenue can be accrued to a host-government. Taxing the extraction of 
non-renewable resources is a highly political matter, where policymakers often deal with powerful 
domestic and international actors, in both the public and the private sector.  
Other important features that characterize the REI are its short-term and long-term benefits  
—or rents— for the extraction firms. In the short term, REI can generate substantial rents through, for 
example, windfall profits – caused by global commodity price hikes. Long-term benefits of the REI 
are owed to the market entry barriers experienced by new firms. These market entry barriers are 
partially caused by what are known as ‘sunk costs’.  
RE requires high initial investments in the exploration and development phase, and generally 
involves long production periods. The exploration phase is lengthy and costly, and there is no income 
during this phase. Besides this, the profitability tends to be uncertain at the start. One last 
consideration is the Dutch Disease. The term ‘Dutch disease’ is derived from a phenomenon observed 
after major increases in wealth in the Netherlands in the 1960’s, following the discovery of large gas 
deposits in the North Sea. The Dutch gulden became stronger, thereby making non-oil exports less 
competitive. The syndrome associated with this phenomenon is known as the Dutch disease.  
The term can be applied to any development that triggers a large inflow of a foreign currency 
(Ward, 2009). The Dutch disease causes increases in the value of the currency and it reduces the 
competiveness of other exports (Kohl & Farthing, 2012). Manufacturing might decline and inflation 
might increase as a result of increases in natural resource revenues exerting a knock-on effect on 
exchange rates (Ward, 2009). 
For these reasons, the REI is unique in its essential qualities, which is why many states 
manage and regulate this industry carefully.  
B. Designing a fiscal regime for mining  
Governments with a large amount of non-renewable resources play a pivotal role in the design and 
implementation of regulatory and fiscal frameworks, and in macroeconomic management, strategic 
                                                                    
8  The pure economic rent of the mineral resource is the difference between the value of the output in international 
prices and the cost of production of the ore at the minehead. The following cash streams are derived from this 
economic rent: (i) the fiscal payments received by the state in the form of taxes, royalties or other levies; (ii) the 
private earnings of the extractive companies; and (iii) payment of the factors of production used beyond the 
extraction stage, which mostly consists in remuneration of personnel employed by the extractive companies 
(ECLAC, 2013: 25). This rent is calculated as the margin realized after netting off from the gross mineral revenue 
all the costs of production —recurrent and capital recovery costs— as well as a minimum return on capital high 
enough to attract capital and retain it in the project (IMDC, 2012). 
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planning, public policy design and implementation (ECLAC, 2013). Deciding upon the functioning of 
fiscal regime for mining9
A government has to consider; attracting foreign investment to explore and exploit minerals; 
maximizing fiscal revenues in order to ensure local citizens receive a fair share of the mineral wealth; 
and, enhancing development in the REI. A government looking for a sustainable development of the 
local REI needs to balance these considerations, which often involves bargaining between the state 
and the private sector —including major transnational corporations—. 
 implies many trade-offs for a government.  
Sustainably developing local REI’s, and ensuring public revenue collection from those 
industries, requires substantial administrative capacity, public infrastructure, and political 
commitment. The government of a resource-rich state has broadly three instruments at its disposal for 
participating in mining rents. 
1. Participation of the State 
The most direct approach is through the exploration and exploitation of natural resources by state-
owned enterprises; the Chilean state-owned copper-mining enterprise CODELCO is an example of 
direct state involvement. However, as indicated earlier, many states do not have the financial resources 
or the technical expertise to endeavor into mineral exploration and exploitation. State-owned 
enterprises often respond to the particular interests of powerful groups in states with a weak 
governance framework, a low level of state capacity, and unsophisticated state institutions. This 
affects the sector’s productivity and future investment levels. Often encountered problems by states 
participating in the REI are:  
• Boom and bust cycles: where commodity prices rise sharply and then plunge (Kohl & 
Farthing, 2012). Short-term extractive booms also make sustainable development more 
difficult because they reduce the incentive to invest in other activities (Sachs &  
Warner, 1999). These boom and bust cycles might encourage unsustainable spikes in 
government social spending, and it might even deteriorate democratic checks and 
balances as a result of increased corruption (Collier & Hoefler, 2009; Heinrich, 2011).  
• The resource curse: when relatively poor countries have an abundance of natural resources 
this might become the cause of their poverty and economic instability (Auty, 1993). In 
those countries the abundance of natural resources can cause that; manufacturing is lacking 
behind; rent-seeking is very common; governments are continuously unstable; their 
institutional capacity isn’t strong; an educated workforce develops more slowly; and, that 
economic inequality is greater than more balanced economies (Karl, 1997). The resource 
curse also refers to stagnation and conflict as a result of the resource abundance. This 
occurs when the revenues from these resources are misappropriated by corrupt leaders and 
officials, rather than being to support growth and investment (Palley, 2003). 
A However, state-led RE in more institutionally strong states can be an effective way of 
collecting resource rents, as it has shown potential in some parts of the world. A resource boom in a 
nation where the resources have been nationalized can considerably benefit society when state 
institutions are competent, and accountable even if only to a small group as is the case in some of the 
OPEC states (McPhail, 2009). The small OPEC states like Qatar been able to diversify their economic 
if not productive activity (Kohl & Farthing, 2012). Another example of successful nationalization is 
Norway. Norway has successfully been using revenues from North Sea oil to subsidize social 
democratic benefits to its citizens (Eifert, Gelb & Tallroth, 2003).  
                                                                    
9  Because this is a report on lithium governance, the literature on fiscal management will be discussed in relation to 
the mining industry. Although most concepts apply to other extractive industries as well, such as the petroleum 
industry, there are different academic approaches to the analysis of fiscal policies for petroleum and fiscal policies 
for minerals (IMF, 2012a: 12).  
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Besides the participation of the state through state-owned enterprises, there are two more 
distinct types of state participation; (i) the state can contribute to some of the project costs of mining by 
providing infrastructure, or lump sum subsidies, for example; and, (ii) the state can share in the project 
benefits, through receiving equity for cash on private investor terms, for example. Other examples of the 
second type of state-participation are contractual-based systems; these can be subdivided in two types of 
contracts: production sharing contracts (PSA’s) and service agreements (SA’s). 
The PSA and SA contractual-based systems are not very common in the mineral-industry 
concessions are the norm (Johnston, 2007; ICMM, 2009). A concession is granted by the state to a 
holder, who has a real right to the concession or the use of the resource, but not to the resource itself 
(ECLAC, 2013). One reason for the preference for concessions lies in the marketability of minerals 
and mineral products. When a government is the owner of the extracted mineral product —as is the 
case with PSA’s and SA’s— it is also responsible for the distribution and sale of this product.  PSA’s 
and SA’s are therefore useful when a government can rather easily sell products domestically or on the 
international market, as with fossil fuels for example.  
For mineral products, such marketing is more difficult; private enterprises generally are more 
experienced in these matters. Transnational firms therefor play an important role in the REI, precisely 
because of their marketing experience, technical expertise, and their available capital. A host-
government is, however, still able to share in the revenues generated by the local —privatized— REI. 
The most widely applied mechanism for rent sharing in the REI is through tax-concessions. 
Concessions allow companies to take full control of the entire production process. The owner of 
natural resources —usually the state— gives these concessions. When a host-government decides to 
concess a mineral, or a deposit, it can tax these private RE firms through profit- and production-based 
taxation, both forms are discussed below.  
2. Production-based taxation 
Most host-governments do not treat REI’s as any other economic activity, but rather create specific tax 
regimes for the REI. A state can levy production-based taxes on local REI’s. A common production-
based tax is the royalty.10 Royalties can be charged as a share of produced value or as a fixed amount 
per product unit. Production-based royalties are usually regressive; 11
Production-based taxes are administratively not as strenuous as profit-based taxes, but they 
may lead to market distortions and lower investment in the future. The academic literature on resource 
taxation seems to support a move towards greater reliance on profit or income based direct tax 
instruments,
 which implies that lower 
productivity equals a higher tax burden. Other production-based taxes are sales taxes and foreign trade 
duties. The advantage to royalties is that they are able to generate revenue regardless of company 
profits. However, the disadvantage is that royalties potentially affect investment or production levels 
for the present or future profitability of mining projects might be reduced.  
12
Even if progressive tax instruments could generate more revenue, political pressures can 
move a government’s interest to receiving resource revenue sooner rather than later —through 
regressive— production based-taxation.  
 and less reliance on regressive taxation. Most mine-hosting governments apply a 
mixture of the progressive and regressive tax instruments, for they often wish to receive revenue on 
both the short term and the long term.  
  
                                                                    
10  Royalties are technically ‘rents’ and not taxes, as their logic follows the notion of a firm paying a state for the right 
to extract the non-renewable natural resources that the latter owns (NSI, 2013). 
11  A regressive tax system is where the marginal tax rate decreases proportionally with income. 
12  Proposals for progressive tax instruments for the taxation of the resource rent include the Resource Rent Tax (RRT) 
and the Brown tax (Garnaut and Ross, 1983; Fraser and Kingwell, 1997). 
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3. Profit-based taxation 
When private companies extract and explore mineral resources, a government can choose to levy taxes 
on corporate income, profits, or cash flow. Profit-based taxes are able to reflect, address, and tax the 
distinct features of REI’s through, for example, resource rent taxes or windfall taxes. From a 
theoretical perspective, profit-based taxation should not excessively affect investment or production in 
a negative way; the mining-activity is still profitable.   
A government looking for a progressive tax regime 13  on mining, in order to minimize 
investment disincentives, generally levies profit-based taxes. One of the main forms of profit-based 
taxation is through corporate income taxation (CIT). The state seizes a percentage of the profits that 
firms make from their commercial activities through CIT’s.14 The taxable income is calculated on the 
surplus that comes from subtracting all operation costs plus the depreciation of assets involved in 
production from the revenues obtained in a given period of time. A downside of the CIT is that revenue 
tends to be cyclical, and dependent on mineral prices. This is a problem because governments often need 
to be able to spend more during economic downturns than they need during economic booms.15
Another option is to link a royalty amount to a benchmark that is a proxy for the profitability of the 
operation. This turns royalty payments into the equivalent of a specific tax that marginally increases the 
normal tax burden paid by a company on its reported profits (ECLAC, 2014). A report of the  
IMF (2012) reiterates the benefits of progressive, profit-based, taxation as opposed to regressive taxation: 
 
“A key objective is (…) to maximize the present value of net government revenues from [the 
extractive industry], an objective best served by taxes explicitly targeted on rents: by definition, 
any other tax leads to distortion that reduce those rents, and hence the amount of revenue that 
can be raised”. 
The general assumption is that private-sector companies also favor this form of progressive  
—profit-based— taxation. One major consideration therein is that profit-based taxes protect exorbitant 
taxation in the development phase of a mining-project. This type of taxation, however, is difficult to 
design and monitor for it requires tax authorities to independently estimate the profits (ECLAC, 2014).  
Fiscal regimes generally rely on private firms to report their profits, after which the 
government audits these filing. The general assumption is therefore: the simpler the taxation system, 
the simpler it is to audit these filings. For a government to audit tax-filings, they often need very 
specific information, which might be difficult to obtain (IMF, 2012); the assessment of the quality and 
value of the mineral ores, and the accompanying royalties, for example.  
This information asymmetry between government and private firm can lead to transfer 
pricing.16
Governments require independent mechanisms and specific indicators to ensure that profits 
and costs are transparent throughout price cycles (ECLAC, 2014). One way of combatting these 
 Moreover, developing states can have an especially hard time dealing with multinational 
firms and their sophisticated legal and accounting services. These legal and accounting services can 
reduce a firm’s tax burden by exaggerating costs and artificially reducing taxable profits. CIT is also 
vulnerable to tax evasion, through transfer pricing for example.  
                                                                    
13  A progressive tax regime, in this document, refers to where the marginal tax rate increases as the taxable base 
amount increases.  
14  For a detailed account of CIT issues with special importance for the REI, see IMF (2012) 
15  There are mechanisms to deal with economic downturns and negative mineral prices cycles, through the use of 
adequate institutions to save income from boom periods to be used in crises times such as the Chilean Economic 
and Social Stabilization Fund (ESSF).  
16  Transfer pricing refers to instances where prices for project inputs and outputs are expressed in ways that minimize 
a company’s tax liabilities. Examples of transfer pricing are; inflating the reported costs of tax deductible inputs 
purchased from overseas affiliates, or by reporting sales values to overseas affiliates at a lower level than would be 
expected given global market conditions (ICMM, 2009; IMF, 2012).  
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negative externalities is through a state-owned mining enterprise, the reporting of which can ensure 
transparency in profits and costs (ECLAC, 2014; IMF, 2012a). Saínz, argued on this topic:  
“The existence of public enterprises should not be excluded as a principle. On the contrary they 
may constitute an excellent operative reference to judge the conduct and profitability of FDI 
enterprises and open the possibility to participate in the levels of production, (…)” (Saínz, 2007).  
Finally, progressive taxation usually generates little revenue in the initial years of production. 
This is why developing governments looking for a rapid, and more easily monitored, inflow of 
revenue usually rely on production-based taxes.  
Table 1 contains an overview of the most-used profit- and production-based taxes. 
Table 1 
Main tax types  
 
Profit-based taxes Production-based taxes 
Corporate income tax Royalty; unit based (flat-rate) and value based (ad valorem) 
Profit tax on dividends Sales and excise tax 
Royalty based on profit / income measure Payroll tax 
Withholding tax on remitted dividends Export duty 
Resource rent tax Import duty 
Excess profit tax / Windfall tax Value added tax (VAT) 
 Applications / Issuing / Registration fees  
and stamp duty 
 Land rents 
 Withholding tax on loan interests and services 
 Property tax 
Source: Constructed by the authors from: ICMM, 2009;   IMDC, 2012; IMF, 2012. 
 
The excess profit tax —or the windfall tax— has lately received more attention, because of 
the recent rise in global demand and prices for minerals and metals. The excess profit tax is an 
effective way of capturing higher profits, because it is a progressive tax instrument. Unit-based, or 
flat-rate, royalties refer to the application of fixed monetary rates to a physical rather than a financial 
base such as per ton. Value-based, or ad valorem, royalties refer to the uniform percentage —the 
rate— of the value —the base— of the mineral in the products sold by the miner (IMDC, 2012). The 
use of royalties as tax instruments for REI’s is a topic of intellectual debate.  
One argument against the use of royalties is that royalties do not necessarily generate steady 
payments; investors might cut back production the most at the largest sites, which have higher per-unit 
costs. Mining companies are incentivized to extract only the easily recoverable resources; leaving the 
developing host-country with the resource-deposits that are difficult to extract. The scope of this 
report is, however, too limited to deal with this debate in a comprehensive manner; Otto et al. (2006), 
and the ICMM (2009), ECLAC (2014) and NSI (2013) reports provide detailed accounts of the issues 
and experiences with the use of royalties. 
C. Government and private firm bargaining and transparency 
For a developing resource-rich state, choosing an approach to make a profit from the exploitation of 
its non-renewable resources presents various challenges. The institutional environment in developing 
states is generally not as defined and restricted by formal regulation as in developed states. When 
dealing with mineral RE, developed states tend to unilaterally legislate the fiscal terms through either 
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a mining code or in other pertinent legislation. Developing governments occasionally make specific, 
ad-hoc, deals with private mining firms, bypassing the existing fiscal legislature. Although this does 
proof useful when trying to attract foreign investment, it does potentially harm the process of 
developing a coherent, effective industry-wide fiscal regime.  
Those privately negotiated contracts and agreements between governments and RE firms are 
generally not passed by the legislature. Governments argue that the terms of the contracts should not be 
publicly available; in order to enhance the government’s negotiating power with different companies. 
This also means that the RE firms involved are unable to publish detailed information on their revenue 
payments. These firms are often stressing transparency-related issues, for this is an opportunity to make 
citizens aware of the fiscal contribution, and how this revenue is spent  (ICMM, 2009).  
A lack of transparency can translate into higher financing cost, lower level of investment, and 
fewer opportunities for tax-collection in the future. The closed nature of ad-hoc deals between host-
governments and RE firms therefore does not only create openings for illicit behavior, it potentially 
impedes the establishment of an effective fiscal regime. Transparency can also aid greater 
coordination and harmonization of tax treatment among investment-receiving countries. This helps 
preventing tax competition between resource rich states attempting to attract FDI’s (ECLAC, 2013). 
The IMF (2012) affirms that transparent and effective administration of fiscal regimes for the REI is 
critical for both revenue, and investor confidence. 
Scholars have argued that a state’s credibility is one of its key resources. This credibility “(…) 
arises where the rules and regulations governing the sector are clear and the funds collected are used 
transparently in the common interest” (Von Haldenwang, 2011). This sentiment is reaffirmed once 
more with the creation of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). The EITI is an 
initiative by a coalition of governments, companies, and civil society.  
The initiative pleads that governments should make their revenue incomes, and fiscal 
agreements, publicly available, so citizens can see the contribution of the natural resources to the 
national development. It is important to note that none of the countries discussed in this report  
—Australia, Argentina, Bolivia, China, and Chile— are implementing the EITI at the moment of 
writing this report. Transparency is often associated with effective sectorial regulation, institutions 
such as the European Commission and the OECD therefore press for country-by-country reporting by 
multinational RE firms.  
The IMF also recognizes the lack of transparency as a vital issue; they claim that the data on 
government revenues from the REI are poor; “One-off confidential agreements make the law opaque, 
and the negotiation process is open to abuse” (2012). For this reason, the IMF devised an initiative to 
make these data more transparent, through a standard template to collect data on government revenues 
from natural resources (IMF, 2014).  Another initiative for the disclosure of revenue data comes from 
the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD, 2014).  
Promoting transparency therefore also benefits the long-term perspective of sectorial 
development. This also requires stakeholder involvement, and the disclosure of information, in order 
to gain local legitimacy. 
 In previous decades, at the outset of extraction projects, private resource extracting 
enterprises had a strong bargaining position with respect to host-governments. This strong bargaining 
position stemmed from a combination of; high investment needs; under-exploration of natural 
resources; and poor domestic capacities in finance, infrastructure, technical expertise, and project 
management. Moreover, developing states often had trouble defining the quality and value of their 
unexploited natural resources. With a relatively small tax base, governments were incentivized to offer 
lenient fiscal regimens in order to attract private capital.  
At present, the distribution of bargaining power situation has changed a great deal. The 
commodity-market is more demand-driven, which leads to governments having a stronger bargaining 
position, for there are likely to be more interested private parties competing for access to the natural 
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resources. Despite the changing bargaining positions of the host-government and the interested private 
firms, there is still an information asymmetry between the two, normally to the disadvantage to the 
host-government (IMF, 2012a). Land (2007) notes that host-governments often lack the capacity to 
negotiate effectively with international companies. Land indicates that host-governments often did not 
consider progressive taxation instruments in their attempt at attracting investment. This lack of 
capacity, and poor coordination among different government entities are common sources of 
incoherence in fiscal and other sector relevant policies (Land, 2007).  
Ultimately, private enterprises hold three alternatives: first, they can refrain from investing; 
second, they can accept higher risks or lower profits by offering better deals than the competitors; or 
third, they can try to externalize risk and costs. In a weak governmental institutional environment, 
private firms often prefer the third alternative. Risk and costs externalization can be achieved through 
legal action. Examples are; political risk coverage, such as public export credit guarantees; investment 
protection, through bilateral investment treaties; and international contract enforcement. 
The bargaining positions change once more when a mining-project starts production, after the 
exploration and development phases have finished; private RE firms have then invested significant 
sunk costs. Private firms are therefore less mobile —or captive even— in this position of ‘obsolete 
bargaining’, which makes them vulnerable for unilateral government action.  
Ex-post unilateral government action, in a time of obsolete bargaining, may create serious 
disincentives for future investments (IMF, 2012a). Ex-post unilateral government action has taken 
place since the rise in demand —and the associated price hike— of many minerals and metals. 
Citizens of mine-hosting states often demand to see immediate results through revenue collection. 
These political pressures influenced governments to implement more regressive forms of taxations, in 
order to accrue immediately visible benefits.  
D. Considerations 
One key reflection is that, for ECLAC, assets in the public domain should come under a special 
regime consisting primarily of the attributes of inalienability, inextinguishability and unseizability. 
Another ECLAC principle for the designing a fiscal regime is the application of progressiveness; a 
proportionately greater state share during price booms that generate extraordinary revenues for the 
sector (ECLAC, 2013). It is important to note, however, that it is unlikely that there is one sole, 
universally applicable fiscal regime, or a single definition of tax-bases, or a series of tax rates that are 
fitting under all circumstances. It is complicated to balance all legitimate interests at all times, under a 
single correct tax.  
However, on the basis of an analysis of academic literature, and reports by organizations 
active in the REI, it is possible to outline a general approach, from an economic perspective. A 
prudent government could try to maximize revenue from the its mineral REI by concentrating on the 
long term development, by taxing the tax-base progressively.  
In a progressive fiscal regime, the state’s participation becomes proportionality greater during 
price boom cycles that generate windfall earnings, for example (ECLAC, 2013). Progressive fiscal 
regimes for mining are likely to be more stable in the long run. In developing nations, where there is 
no strong ex-ante mining code, it is prudent to re-assess its fiscal regime periodically and 
collaboratively; governments and companies need to work in partnership with others to accomplish 
this. Transparency and cooperation prevent perverse tax-competition between states in order to attract 
FDI’s, and it can be beneficial to the establishment of a comprehensive, coherent, fiscal regime 
(Garnaut & Clunies Ross, 1983; Garnaut & Clunies, 1975; ICMM, 2009).  
Furthermore, a resource-extracting firm considers more than a country’s fiscal regime, when 
analyzing the investment-possibilities. Tax incentives, such as tax holidays or accelerated capital cost 
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allowances,17
E. Observations from Latin America and the Caribbean 
 could even be less decisive than tax disincentives. Disincentives include political risk 
and tax uncertainty (IMF, 2012a). For these reasons a host-government would do well to concentrate 
on creating a stable fiscal regime and institutional environment.  Stable fiscal regulation could come in 
the form of ex-ante established mining codes, focusing on strengthening the tax-administration. Host-
states still have the possibility of applying different tax rates for different resources, while using 
uniform tax instruments.  
Governments from resource-rich states in Latin America have been using royalties, in order to profit 
from the extraction of the state-owned natural resources. Royalty rates were drastically lowered during 
the peak of the Washington Consensus at which time governments believed that developing countries 
should reduce corporate taxes in order to incentivize FDI. Royalty rates were lowered from 10-15% of 
revenues to 1-5% of revenues. The specific advise for lowering the royalties came from the World 
Bank and the IMF (NSI, 2013). 
 
Figure 2 
Share of royalties in total fiscal revenues from mining (taxes and royalties) 













Source : ECLAC, 2013. 
.
                                                                    
17  For a comprehensive discussion of the possible tax incentives in fiscal regimes for mining, see ICMM (2009). 
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III. The lithium industry 
A. The application of lithium 
Lithium18
Perhaps most importantly is the use of lithium in batteries. Lithium batteries are proving to be 
an effective and affordable alternative to traditional batteries, through new battery applications such as 
the lithium on (Li-ion) battery (website Minerals Education Coalition). Secondary, rechargeable 
batteries are widely used in hybrid cars and fully electronic automobiles. The increasing salience of 
lithium in the global economy is therefore partially explained by the global search for more 
environmentally friendly, or less fossil fuel-dependent modes of transportation (ibid. 227), and various 
national alternative energy programs (USGS, 2014; USGS, 2012).  
 is the first, and lightest, metal on the periodic table. Lithium is a soft, silver-white metal that 
belongs to the alkali metal group of chemical elements. More than 50 percent of the consumed lithium 
compounds are used in the manufacturing of glass, ceramics, and aluminium. Industrially, lithium is 
used in manufacturing synthetic rubber, greases and other lubricants. Lithium is also gaining 
importance due to its function in nuclear fusion (Ebensperger et al., 2005).  
Lithium is found all over the world, including in the oceans, and is not a rare earth element. 
However, lithium is difficult to extract. Lithium requires both favourable environmental surroundings 
—due to the metals volatile nature— and scientific expertise, for efficient extraction and production 
(U.S. Geological Survey, 2013). Lithium is found, successfully extracted, and produced in significant 
numbers in the following countries: the United States of America (USA), Argentina, Australia, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Portugal and Zimbabwe (U.S. Geological Survey, 2013). 
B. Global demand of lithium 
Lithium demand is growing steadily. In 2000, lithium demand was approximately 71 kMT Lithium 
Carbonate Equivalent (LCE).19
                                                                    
18  Chemical symbol Li, atomic number 3. 
 In 2010, lithium demand was estimated between 125 and 130 kMT.  
19  Lithium Carbonate (Li2CO3) is the main chemical of consumed lithium, used in applications such as batteries, 
glass, and others. LCE stands for Lithium Carbonate Equivalent, which is 5,323 x Li. For more information on 
Lithium compound conversion rates, see: website Western Lithium. 
CEPAL Governance of strategic minerals in Latin America… 
22 
By 2012 demand reached an approximate 130 kMT LCE which amounted to a market size of  
US$ 600 million. SQM (2013b) estimated global LCE demand at between 155 and 160 kMT in 2013.  
Estimates on future demand vary; some argue lithium demand will grow roughly to  
400 kMT LCE by 2020 (Western Lithium, 2010), an increase of more than 207%. Others predict a 
more modest growth in demand, with estimates between 230 and 280 kMT LCE in 2020 
(SERNAGEOMIN, 2014; SQM, 2013a; TruGroup, 2011; Li3 Energy, 2013), which would mean a 
growth of between 72 and 115 percent. SQM predicts a lithium demand of 440 kMT by 2030 
(SQM, 2011: 8).  
Figure 3 shows the expected growth, as calculated by Talison Lithium (2012) and 
COCHILCO (2013), based on current market conditions and pricing. 
Figure 3 












Source: Constructed by the authors from:  COCHILCO, 2013; Talison Lithium, 2012a. 
One of the reasons lithium consumption is expected to grow is because of the growth of the 
electric vehicle industry (FMC, 2013) as also displayed in figure 3, above.  By way of illustration: 
Tesla —one of the world’s biggest electric vehicle manufacturer— is planning to build a 
“gigafactory”. This gigafactory could become the biggest battery factory in the world. This would 
significantly increase production of li-ion batteries. Tesla stated it will be manufacturing more li-ion 
batteries in this factory by 2020, than were made in 2013 worldwide. This will not only lower the cost 
of battery packs, but also significantly increase lithium demand. An increase in demand will have a 
great impact on big lithium producers such as SQM (CNBC, 2014).  
Another reason lithium demand is expected to grow, according to experts on the lithium industry, 
is because of considerable growth in the Asian market. Especially the lithium used for rechargeable 
batteries has a lot of growth potential in the Asian market, with increasing demand in South-Korea, Japan, 
and —perhaps most importantly— China (Interview Desormeaux, 2014; website ChinaGoAbroad). The 
Chinese market is particularly interesting due to the Chinese government’s financial support for 
manufacturers of autos with alternative energy sources (Fox-Davies Resource Specialist, 2013: 8).  
It is expected that the Chinese will buy increasingly more lithium and lithium-using products, 
as the Chinese market grows.  The main importers of lithium carbonate are displayed in figure 4.  
With growing global demand for lithium, and predictions of increasing global demand 
(Vikström et al, 2013), this light metal is of great interest to any government, or private business, 







































according to the USGS and Fox-Davies, the prices for battery-grade20
 
 lithium carbonate are between 
US$ 6,500 and US$ 7,000 per metric ton (USGS, 2014; Fox-Davies Resources Specialist, 2013).  
Figure 4 











Source: COCHILCO, 2013. 
 
Lithium carbonate is therefore not what makes li-on batteries for electric vehicles expensive; 
its high price is due to the technological cost to make these batteries. If this price lowers, lithium 
batteries for EV’s will be in higher demand, therefore encouraging lithium exploration.  
There are two matters that might negatively influence future lithium carbonate demand:  
(i) someone might come up with a new, better, safer, cheaper form of energy storage than lithium-
batteries, and; (ii) lithium batteries can be recycled, and chances are these recycling technologies will 
advance as well, this could cause a significant decrease in the demand for raw lithium. 
The lithium-industry in Latin America is especially interesting since it holds approximately 
65% of the lithium-resources. For a geographic representation of the global distribution of lithium 
resources, see Appendix 1.  
C. Global availability of lithium resources 
The economically recoverable global lithium reserves are estimated to be between 69,199 kMT LCE 
(USGS, 2014) and 100,000 kMT LCE (SQM, 2011; Ministerio Minería, 2010). The global lithium 
resource availability is estimated at between, 195,460 kMT LCE (COCHILCO, 2013), 207,600 kMT 
LCE (USGS, 2014) and 300,000 kMT LCE (SQM, 2011; Ministerio Minería, 2010). The estimated 
figures on available resources and reserves are constantly changing. These numbers are not fixed as 
the calculation of reserves is based on the economic profitability of extraction, which means that the 
figures on the reserves change as extraction technology develops and improves.  
The worldwide sources of lithium are found in various ore-deposits; approximately 70% of the 
lithium is found in brines, 20% in pegmatite minerals, and the rest of the lithium is found in clays, and 
other ore-deposit types  (SERNAGEOMIN, 2014; USGS, 2014). The vast majority of lithium is 
currently extracted in two ways. The first extraction-method is from continental brines in salt lakes. 
Continental brines in salt-lakes are high salt content waters, which store lithium below or at the surface. 
                                                                    
20  Battery grade lithium carbonate is a high-grade lithium. See appendix 2.  
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Lithium chloride and carbonate is extracted from brines by solar evaporation, in so-called evaporation-
ponds. The second source of extraction is from hard rock, pegmatite minerals, such as spodumene.21
These minerals can be conversed to lithium carbonate and hydroxide (COCHILCO, 2013). In 
Latin America, thus Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia, lithium is extracted from brines; in Australia, 
lithium is extracted from mineral pegmatite namely spodumene; in China lithium is extracted from 
both salt deposit brines and pegmatite minerals. In 2012, 50,4 percent of the total world production 
came from salt deposits, and 49,6 percent from pegmatite minerals (COCHILCO, 2013). Extracting 
lithium from pegmatite minerals is a more expensive process than extracting lithium from brines 
(Gruber et al., 2011), which gives Latin American lithium producers a significant advantage over other 
—lithium-pegmatite— producers.  
  
D. Global lithium production 
The production of lithium compounds has increased significantly in the past years, from 97 kMT LCE 
in 2005, to 178,4 kMT LCE in 2012 (COCHILCO, 2014:15). This is an increase of more than 83%. 
Table 2 shows the top lithium producing countries between 2005 and 2013. Table 2 also shows the 
total resource availability in the respective states.  
Table 2 
Estimates of world lithium production per country in kMT LCE,  
and the total Resource Availability (RA) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total RA  (kMt LCE) 
RA 
 (% of total) 
Argentina 14.8 15.8 13.4 19.2 13.9 16.7 14.0 17.6 - 37 740 19.3 
Australia 20.1 29.3 36.8 33.4 30.0 45.4 62.6 67.5 - 8 091 4.1 
Bolivia - - - - - - - - 1.0 47 374 24.2 
Chile 43.7 47.3 54.9 52.3 27.3 47.3 63.3 65.6 55.9 42 797 21.9 
China 4.8 4.9 5.2 7.5 14.7 15.5 12.9 16.0 - 27 413 14.0 
USA 3.4 3.8 3.5 3.6 - - 1.0 2.5 - 8 889 4.5 
Other 10.6 11.1 11.8 12.2 10.4 9.1 8.7 9.2 - 23 155 11.8 
 






Source: Constructed by the authors from:  COCHILCO, 2013; SERNAGEOMIN, 2014b. 
 
Table 3 shows the world biggest lithium producers, where they produce, where they are 
headquartered, their latest available production volume, and their total production capacity. Note that 
because these figures are based on the latest available production figures, they do not represent the 
production volume of one specific year, but rather a representation of publicly available figures 
between 2008 and 2014. 
It is worth noting that many of these mining companies have transboundary strategic 
partnerships with other mining companies, chemical companies, and corporate groups that process or 
develop lithium compounds. Australian and Canadian miners often have such partnerships with Asian 
enterprises, particularly with Japanese, Korean, and Chinese enterprises. The lithium market in these 
Asian countries is attractive, because of the processing plants located in Asia and the growing Asian 
markets. Some of these strategic partnerships are discussed in the country profiles.   
                                                                    
21  Formula: Li2O.Al2O3.2SiO4. Spodumene varies in its Lithium contents, but approximately holds 8% theoretical 
Li2O content (Talison, 2009).  
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Table 3 
Top lithium producers worldwide 
 
Company Location Headquarter Production  (in kMTpa LCE) 
Production Capacity 
(in kMTpa LCE) 
Talison Lithium Australia (Greenbushes) Australia 53.0 c 74.0 c 
SQM Chile (Atacama) Chile 36.1d 48.0 e 
Rockwood Holdings (SCL) Chile (Atacama / La Negra) USA 23.8 d 28.0 e 
FMC Argentina (Hombre Muerto) USA 
16.6 d 23.0 d 
Citic; QLL; Tibet; ABA; Jianxi; 
Minfeng; Ni&Co; XLP; Panasia; 
Tianqi 
China (various) China 
9.9 a 40.0 b 
Various Brazil, Zimbabwe, Portugal, Spain, Canada Various 
5.1 a 15.5 b 
Rockwood Holdings USA (Silverpeak) USA 4.6 d 6.0 d 
Total   149.1 185.0 
Source: Constructed by the authors from:  Western Lithium, 2010; SQM, 2011; Ministerio Minería, 2010; COCHILCO, 2014;  
SQM, 2013b:; Talison Lithium, 2012b; Rockwood, 2013; USGS, 2013). 
 
Table 4 presents the lithium-projects that are in the developmental stage, and their respective 
production capacity.  
Table 4 
Lithium-projects in developmental stage, with respective production capacity  
 
Company Location Headquarter Production Capacity 
(in kMTpa LCE) 
Lithium Americas Argentina (Caucharí) Canada 15 
Orocobre Ltd Argentina (Olaroz) Australia 15 
Sentient Group Argentina (Rinón) Australia 15 
Galaxy Resources Australia (Mt. Cattlin) Australia 17 
Reed Resources Australia (Mt. Marion) Australia 25 
COMIBOL Bolivia (Uyuni) Bolivia 20 
Western Lithium Canada (Mc Dermitt) Canada 27 
Canada Lithium Canada (Quebec) Canada 19 
Li3 Energy Chile (Maricunga) USA 15 
Rio Tinto Serbia (Jadar) United Kingdom 27 
Simbol Mining USA (Salton Sea) USA 16 
Total   213 
Source: Constructed by the authors from:  (Ministerio Minería, 2010; COCHILCO, 2013). 
As shown in Table 4, many of the developing lithium-projects are located in Argentina. 
Ceteris paribus, Argentina is expected to have the highest LCE production capacity by 2020. The only 
project in Chile that is sure of execution is the expansion of Rockwood Holdings with a plant in the 
Salar La Negra, which will add a production capacity of ~20 kMT LCE per year (El Mercurio, 
Economía y Negocios, November 2014).  
Figure 5 shows the predicted growth in LCE production capacity of the biggest lithium 
producing states based on an international market analysis by COCHILCO (2013). These projections 
show that Chile will stray further away from its position as leading lithium producer, which partially 
explains the current political ambition by the Chilean government to address the Chilean lithium 
market, through the NLC.  
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Figure 5 
Total LCE production capacity in ton per annum  













Source: Constructed by the authors from:  COCHILCO, 2014. 
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IV. Profiles of lithium producing countries 
A. International benchmark country profile: Australia 
As indicated earlier, Australia is currently the biggest lithium producer in the world. Besides lithium, 
Australia is one of the world’s leading producers of minerals, producing 19 different minerals in 
significant amounts, from more than 400 different mines.  
Table 5 
Lithium characteristics Australia 
 
Mine Enterprises Average lithium concentration  
(in % Li) 
Li reserves 
(in kMT) 
Mt. Cattlin Galaxy Resources 0.50 70 
Greenbushes Talison Lithium 1.60 560 
Mt. Marion  0.65 20 
Source: Constructed by the authors from:  COCHILCO, 2013; Gruber et al., 2011; Vikström et al. 2013). 
The industry’s export —excluding oil and gas— were worth AUS$107 billion22
The lithium industry in Australia is based on the mining of a high quality spodumene, which 
can be processed into battery grade lithium carbonate. The Australian government only publishes 
statistics on spodumene production however these figures are not easy to come by because Western 
Australia aggregates data on lithium, with tin and tantalum for publicly released figures.
 between  
2012 and 2013 (Geoscience Australia), Lithium is mined from salt lakes and from pegmatite, 
respectively in the form of brines and in the form of spodumene, for example.  
23
  
 Table 6 
shows the spodumene production of 2001 to 2012, based on sources of the USGS and the federal 
Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
                                                                    
22  ~91,47 billion US$. 
23  The analysis of spodumene is not so simple, as production is often quoted as spodumene concentrates which are not 
100% spodumene. Spodumene is ~8% LiO2, which equals ~3.72% Li. Theoretically, ~26.5 tonnes of spodumene is 
required for one tonne of lithium. However the amount of concentrates required will depend on the purity  
of the concentrate.  
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Table 6 
Spodumene and Lithium (tonnes) production in Australia 
Year Produced Spodumene  (in t) 
Produced Li  
(in ~t) 
Produced LCE  
(in ~t) 
2001 90 400 a 3 363 17 901 
2002 102 573 a 3 816 20 313 
2003 114 568 a 4 262 22 687 
2004 108 804 a 4 048 21 548 
2005 193 229 a 7 188 38 262 
2006 290 432 a 10 804 57 510 
2007 246 015 a 9 152 48 716 
2008 239 528 b 8 910 47 428 
2009 197 482 b 7 346 39 103 
2010 295 000 b 10 974 58 415 
2011 421 396 b 15 676 83 443 
2012 456 921 b 16 997 90 475 
Source: Constructed by the authors from: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2013; USGS, 2013b. 
1. Private companies exploiting lithium in Australia 
In Australia the two main lithium-producing companies are Talison Lithium and Galaxy Resources. 
Talison Lithium produces its lithium from Greenbushes mine, and Galaxy Resources produces its 
lithium mainly from Mount Cattlin. Both companies mine their lithium in the State of Western 
Australia, meaning that they’re both subject to the fiscal regime of the Western Australian State 
Government (Talison Lithium; Galaxy Resources). The Chinese chemical company Tianqi and 
Rockwood Lithium from the USA have recently bought Talison Lithium, which is further discussed. 
The Australian mineral resource classification scheme of JORC identified 854 kMT Li as accessible 
for mining in Australia, as of the 31st of December 2013 (Geoscience Australia, 2013). 
2. Fiscal regimes in lithium mining in Australia 
In Australia government responsibilities are shared between the Australian federal Government and 
State and Territory Government taxes. In Australia sub-national governments are empowered to raise 
mining taxes, as part of the federalist political-administrative setup. The federal government possesses 
overall power to tax income and consumption. The Australian States and Territories —not the federal 
government— own the rights to minerals. As a consequence each State and Territory has its own 
mining acts and regulations to control the exploration for, and the extraction of minerals on public and 
private lands. The Australian State and Territory Governments levy various mining-taxes an overview 
is presented in Table 7.  
Table 7 
Taxation of Lithium in Western-Australia 
Lithium Royalty 5% - Any royalty paid at the state level is deducted as an expense from income at the federal level. 
Top rate of Corpora  
Income Tax (CIT) 
30% - Flat rate 
Level at which 




The states  Western Australia in the lithium sources used for this document. Lithium is treated as any 
other mineral product. 
Land taxes All States/Territories impose land taxes as an annual tax on the unimproved value of land held in the 
State/Territory. The rates vary from State/Territory, but are in all cases progressive. The government 
of Western Australia has a list of all land tax rates (website Department of Finance). 
Source: Constructed by the authors from:  Department of Mines and Petroleum; PwC, 2012;  ICMM, 2009.  
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In Australia lithium is treated as any other onshore mineral. This means that the royalties on 
lithium extraction are collected at the level of the States and Territories. In Australia there is no 
common royalty regime at the federal level (Department of Industry). At the federal level, the only 
revenues collected from the mining industry are through income taxation. As noted earlier, lithium 
production is only significant in the province of Western-Australia. The Mining Act of 1978 dictates 
all mining regulations with regard to governmental activity, such as royalties;24
In Australia, all states and territories have the power to levy royalties, as a purchase price for 
minerals extracted by mining companies. The corporate income tax, in Australia called the Federal 
Company Income Tax, is levied on the taxable income of a lithium-producing company. The two 
principal Commonwealth Acts that deal with income tax are the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 and 
the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. The Commissioner of Taxation, a statutory official appointed 
under provisions of the Taxation Administration Act 1953, heads the Australian Taxation Office. The 
Commissioner has general administration of his Act. The Taxation Administration Act 1953 also 
contains provisions relating to tax collection, administration, and recovery of tax payments. 
 “When a mineral is 
obtained from a mining tenement, or from land the subject of an application for a mining tenement, 
royalties shall be paid by the holder of, or applicant for, the mining tenement” (Mining Act 1978).  
The Australian government deems it important that its communities receive benefits from the 
state’s mineral resource wealth, through imposed charges. Under the Australian Constitution, State 
Governments —and not the National Government— own minerals on behalf of the people. The Australian 
Constitution was designed prior to Australia becoming a nation in 1901. By giving the State Governments 
ownership of the minerals the State’s maintained the revenue and control of these minerals. 
3. Redistribution of collected REI revenue in Australia 
The public finance system of Australia does not have a regulated way of returning minerals revenues 
to the mining communities. Mining companies generally do not pay rates to local government bodies. 
However, there are special government programs and initiatives, such as the indigenous 
communities/mining industry regional partnership program: Working in Partnership (WIP).  These 
partnerships aim to support and encourage cultural change taking place in relations between 
indigenous communities and the mining industry. Their aim is also to promote long-term effective 
partnerships that benefit all stakeholders. 
B. International benchmark country profile: China 
As indicated earlier in this report, much of the information on fiscal regimes, production-figures, and 
revenue-data with regard to lithium, are difficult to obtain. This information with regard to the 
Chinese lithium industry is especially difficult to come by (COCHILCO, 2013: 34). 
Lithium brine sources that have higher concentrations of magnesium than that found in Chile 
and Argentina, such as those in China, have difficulty —or even find it impossible— to produce high 
purity battery grade lithium carbonate.  
China’s domestic’s spodumene is also of low quality and cannot be used to produce battery 
grade carbonate. This is why the Chinese chemical company Sichuan Tianqi Lithium Industry has 
bought 51% of Australia’s Talison Lithium in 2013, as Talison Lithium has very high quality 
spodumene that can be processed into battery grade lithium carbonate. Tianqi has created a joint 
venture with Rockwood Holdings,25
                                                                    
24  For the full list of royalties levied on all non-renewable natural resources in Western Australia see; website 
Australasian Legal Information Institute. 
 which, as indicated earlier, has recently bought 49% of Talison 
Lithium (website Business Wire, May 2014).   
25  Rockwood Holdings is now for 70% owned by Albemarle, as indicated. 
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Table 8 
Lithium characteristics of Salares and Pegmatite mines in China 
Salar Enterprises Li ore grade (in mg/l) 




Mt. Zhabuye Tibet Lithium New Technology Dev. 680 1 530  243 
Diangxiongcuo Tibet Sunrise Mining Dev. 400 - 56 
Xitai Qinghai CITIC 310 - - 
Dontai - 300 - - 
Qaidam - 300 2 020  
Pegmatite Mine Enterprises Average lithium concentration  (in % Li) 
Li reserves 
(in kMT) 
Jiajika GanZi Rongda Lithium 0.59 204 
Yichun - - 325 
Maerking - - 225 
Gajika - - 591 
Daoxian - - 182 
Source: Constructed by the authors from:  COCHILCO, 2013; Gruber et al., 2011. 
Tianqi is focused on the development, production, and sales of chemical lithium products, and 
it operates factories that convert lithium and other chemicals in China. By acquiring Talison, Tianqi is 
assured of its lithium supply. Through the joint venture, Rockwood Holdings now has access to the 
Chinese market; one of the biggest, and fastest growing markets for lithium-consumption. 26
Table 9 
Mining taxation in China  
 The 
Australian Galaxy Resources employs another strategy for entering the Chinese market; it has built its 
conversion plants directly in China.  
 




Corporate income tax levied at 
 
Federal level 
Source: Constructed by the authors from:  (PwC, 2012; KPMG). 
C. Regional analysis country profile: Argentina 
Lithium production is expected to grow significantly in the coming decade. COCHILCO even 
forecasts Argentina to be the biggest lithium producer in the world, by 2020. The Argentinean 
government is looking into the development of its lithium industry. Argentina is currently exporting 
the brine and extracted salts of its salt lakes without treatment, while special products, such as lithium 
batteries, are imported.  
To reverse this situation the Argentinean government started a project called “From the Salar 
to the Battery”, through the National Bureau of Lithium, composed of the ministries of Science and 
Technology, Industry, and Economics. The goal of this project is to develop local lithium-battery 
production; several Argentinean universities are participating in this project (Website Universidad 
Nacional de San Martín; COCHILCO, 2013).  
                                                                    
26  As shown lithium carbonate import has grown with 7 percentage points in China between 2010 and 2012.  
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In Argentina lithium is found in the provinces of Jujuy, Salta, and the north of Catamarca.  
Table 10 
Lithium characteristics of Salares in Argentina 





Hombre Muerto FMC Lithium Corp (Proyecto Fénix) – Galaxy Resources 
(Proyecto Sal de Vida) 
690 565 795 
Salinas Grandes  795 212 - 
Olaroz Orocobre 690 118 156 
Diablillos RodiniaLithium 556 40 - 
Cauchari Lithium Americas 380 350 1 118 
Rincón ADY Resources 330 250 1 118 
Source: Constructed by the authors from COCHILCO, 2013; CODELCO, 2014: Gruber et al., 2011: 7; Gruber & 
Medina, 2010). 
The legal framework encompassing the exploitation of lithium in those provinces is particular. 
The Argentinean Mining Code, and the overall regulations regarding mining, dates back to 1884. The 
federal state preserves the jurisdiction on the application of the laws. However, the process of 
implementation is entrusted to the Argentinean provinces. Mining regulations therefore differ among 
the provinces. In Argentina, lithium is concessible.  
However, in some of the provinces, lithium is considered to be a strategic mineral. In those 
cases extraction has to be approved by a committee of experts (COCHILCO, 2013; Saravia-Frias, 2007; 
UN DESA, 2010).    The relevant fiscal regulations on lithium in Argentina are summarized in Table 11.  
Table 11 
Overview of Argentina’s fiscal regime on mining 
Lithium Royalty 3% - Provincial Mining Royalty (deductible in CIT calculation) 
Top rate of Corporate Income 
Tax (CIT) 
35% - Any royalty paid at the province level is  
deducted as an expense from income at the federal level. 
Level at which CIT is applied Federal  
Tax on exports: 
Ore extracted: 5% 
Processed ore: 5% 
Refined metal: 5% - 10% 
CIT deductions allowed for 
Depreciation of ores, buildings, and machinery;  
applicable to tax paid for first five years. 
Import taxes. 
National concession status Lithium is concessible, however, Lithium is considered to be a strategic resource in several provinces, in those cases the projects have to be approved by experts. 
Ownership of lithium Nation / Provinces 
Source: Constructed by the authors from:  ECLAC, 2014; PwC, 2012; KPMG; NSI, 2013; COCHILCO, 2013). 
D. Regional analysis country profile:  
Plurinational State of Bolivia 
As indicated earlier, Bolivia has currently the largest reserves of lithium in the world. However, 
Bolivia is not yet producing lithium in a significant manner. The following paragraphs provide an 
overview of the history of the relevant legislation, and a brief introduction to the plans of Bolivia 
develop a national lithium industry. 
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Bolivia’s latest Mining Code dates from 1992. In this Code, it declared all mineral deposits of 
Bolivia to be property of the state. Parties are able to obtain mining concessions, given out by the state 
subject to particular payments. These concessions granted the holder the exclusive right to explore, 
exploit and refine the mineral substance located within the concession. Bolivian law treated local and 
foreign companies equally with regard to the acquired concessions. In 2006, however, a Bolivian court 
declared this Mining Code to be unconstitutional.  
Bolivian President Morales signed a decree in 2007 that assures all the existing mining 
concessions would be respected. However, all new concession-requests would have to form a joint 
venture with the Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL) both parties holding 50%. Requests for 
private concessions would no longer be honored. The new Bolivian Constitution of 2009 declared that 
the Bolivian state was in control of all the natural resources in Bolivia. Under this framework, the 
Bolivian state began a public project to industrialize its lithium resources. The National Management 
Committee for Evaporitic Resources (GNRE) headed the project, as a specialized operational branch 
of COMIBOL. Morales gave COMIBOL the objective to protect the natural resources on Bolivian 
territory from foreign resource extracting companies (COCHILCO, 2013).  
The extraction of lithium in Bolivia by foreign companies has historically been controversial. 
The FMC —formerly the Lithium Corporation— had a deal with the Bolivian government to exploit 
lithium in the Salar de Uyuni.  
Table 12 
Lithium resources in Bolivia 










GNRE  350 12 000 10 200 54 294 
Pastos 
Grandes  1 033 100   
Coiposa  319 2 218   
Source: Constructed by the authors from:  COCHILCO, 2013; Gruber et al., 2014; Gruber & Medina, 2010). 
In 1992, however, several Bolivian organizations protested their presence, which led to the 
foreign company being driven out of the country (Radhuber & Vega, 2013).  The Bolivian government 
now wants to keep production and export under state-control, but needs technical assistance.  
To this regard, last year a political agreement for cooperation between the Netherlands and 
Bolivia was signed, in order to develop the Bolivian lithium industry.  Negotiations regarding the 
specific business-deals are still ongoing. 
Table 13 
Overview of Bolivia’s fiscal regime on lithium 
Lithium Royalty 12.5% 
Corporate Income Tax 25% 
National concession status 
Lithium is not concessible. All mining concessions 
have become transitory, since 6-12-2010, by 
presidential Decree. All lithium belongs to the state, 
which also manages it. 
Ownership of lithium The Plurinational State of Bolivia 
Distribution to producing regions Yes 
Mechanism to compensate non-producing regions No 
Source: COMIBOL, 2014. 
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V. Lithium governance in Chile 
A. Introduction 
Chile has abundant natural resources, especially minerals. Chile has very large reserves of lithium and 
copper. Through the exploitation of these reserves, Chile is among the world’s biggest producers of 
both lithium and copper. Chile, however, is a developing state. Although Chile is a member of  
the OECD, it is among the lowest ranking members with regard to GDP and GDP per capita. In 2013, 
the GDP per capita in Chile was US$ 21,990, while the OECD average was US$ 36,427 in 2012 
(Website OECD Statistics). Chile and many other Latin American states are trying to foster their 
natural resources for sustainable development. 
As indicated earlier (Table 2) Chile is one of the most important actors in the lithium industry 
because of its annual mine production and its lithium reserves. In Chile, lithium is currently of little 
importance within commercial mining exports —as shown in Table 14. The exported lithium carbonate in 
US$ has grown with almost 250% from 2003 to 2013— but in comparison the lithium export was only 
0.56% of the total copper exports in US$. Copper, simultaneously, grew by more than 400% from 2003  
to 2013. The Chilean government and the broader Chilean community, however, have a close interest in the 
development and rents of the lithium industry— because of its growth potential (Ebensberger et al. 2005). 
Chile employs remarkable legal regulations for lithium, which are explored in the following paragraphs.  
Table 14 
Mining exports in Chile in millions of US$ 
 Copper Iron Silver Gold Lithium carbonate 
2003 7 995 137 126 302 65 
2004 15 397 161 156 318 75 
2005 19 923 308 172 351 94 
2006 34 069 328 326 530 123 
2007 39 204 402 536 577 189 
2008 31 755 593 380 763 219 
2009 29 695 534 314 910 113 
2010 41 361 1 183 382 1 041 174 
2011 44 670 1 610 689 1 456 204 
2012 41 987 1 338 611 1 644 247 
2013 40 158 1 379 379 1 384 226 
Source: Constructed by the authors from: Banco Central de Chile, 2014. 
 



















Li Carbonate (t) Li Chloride (t) Li Hydroxide (t) 
Chile is responsible for approximately 40% of the production of lithium compounds in the world 
(SERNAGEOMIN, 2014). The total lithium compound production in Chile, in the forms of Lithium 
Carbonate (Li2CO3), Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH), and Lithium Chloride (LiCl), are presented in Figure 6.  
Figure 6 











Source: Constructed by the authors from:  SERNAGEOMIN, 2011; USGS, 2013. 
B. Lithium sources in Chile 
Table 15 contains information on the most important salares in Chile. The table shows the most 
important lithium-characteristics, and which enterprises have claims in the salares.  
Table 15 
Lithium characteristics of Salares in Chile  




Li reserves  
(in kMT) 
Salar de Atacama SQM & Rockwood Lithium (through CORFO) 1 500 3 000 6 500 
Salar de la Isla Talison Lithium 860 152 948 
Punta Negra  350 250 735 
Salar de Maricunga Li3 Lithium & CODELCO Salvador (18%) & Simbalik 800 145 280 
Salar de Pedernales CODELCO Salvador 400 335 240 
Aguilar ENAMI 71 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Constructed by the authors from: COCHILCO, 2013; CODELCO, 2014; Gruber et al., 2011; SERNAGEOMIN, 2014; 
Gruber & Medina, 2010). 
1 This measurement is used for evaluating the quality of a salar as a source of lithium; the concentration  of lithium in the 
brine measured in milligrams per liter (mg/l). 
Other salares in Chile with lithium potential include: Aguas Calientes 2, Pajonales, Quisquiro, 
Aguilar, Tara, Las Parinas, Pujsa, Aguas Calientes 1 , Capur, and Aguas Calientes 4.27
                                                                    
27  For information on the lithium characteristics of these salares, see: SERNAGEOMIN, 2014 
 However, 
according to SERNAGEOMIN (2013), there are only six salares with a medium to high lithium 
potential: Atacama, Aguas Calientes Centro, Pajonales, La Isla, Pedernales, and Maricunga.   
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C. Chilean legislation on mining and lithium 
1. Lithium concessions and concession-law 
The legal aspects of the mining-industry in Chile, especially with regard to lithium, are complex but 
contextually important. The following paragraphs provide an overview of the history of mining 
legislation relevant to the lithium industry.  
In 1932, the Chilean government created its first Mining Code. This Code stated, in Article 3, 
that lithium was concessible. However, the Chilean laws on mining have changed and evolved. There 
are currently three relevant laws on lithium mining: 
• The Chilean government created a new Mining Code in 1983, Law 18.248. This Law 
stated, in article 7, that lithium was not concessible, 28
• Another relevant Law is the Organic Constitutional Law On Mining Concessions, in 1982 
Law 18.097. This Law granted investors the permission to explore for minerals within the 
limits of an exploration concession,
 adding, in article 9, that 
concessions can be given to deposits containing concessible substances, and has to notify 
the state if it encounters non-concessible substances in its deposit. This means that a 
company has to notify the state if it finds lithium.  
29
• Decree Law 2.886 of 1979, declared lithium a state reserved mineral in order to use it for 
nuclear fusion at a later stage. This Decree Law was maintained in Law 18.097 and Law 
18.248. Respecting the right on ownership, the declaration of lithium as non-concessible 
does not influence the mining concessions constituted before the corresponding statements 
on non-concessible minerals made by the Laws 18.097, 18.248 and Decree Law 2.886. 
 which can be secured with the payment of a 
nominal fee, and for a 4 years period. Exploitation concessions are secured through the 
payment of yearly fees. There are no limits to their duration, and ownership can be 
transferred transmitted, the same as with real estate (UN DESA, 2010: 13).  
Since the new Mining Code is in force, the exploitation and commercialization of lithium has 
been carefully regulated, and reserved by the state. As indicated, lithium was considered to be a 
strategic resource by the military government. The mineral was linked to national security due to the 
possible applications lithium might have for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons and atomic energy 
through nuclear fusion (Organic Constitutional Law on Mining Concessions 1982: Article 3).  
The new Organic Constitutional Law stated that the reserve of lithium belonged to Chile, and 
expressly provided that the exploration or exploitation of non-concessible substances, such as lithium, 
can be performed only directly by the State of Chile, or its companies or institutions, or by means of 
administrative concessions or special operation contracts, fulfilling the requirements and conditions 
set forth by the President of Chile for each case. This law additionally stated that the Chilean Nuclear 
Energy Commission would regulate the mineral. This created a significant barrier to the entrance of 
new capital in the lithium industry. In resume then, the forms in which lithium can be exploited in the 
current legal framework of Chile are: 
• Directly through the state. 
• Through the state’s enterprises. 
• By means of administrative concessions. 
• By means of special operating contracts.  
The only companies that are currently exploiting lithium in Chile are SQM and Rockwood 
Holdings (SCL); they had operating contracts with the state owned institution CORFO before  
                                                                    
28  Meaning that it subject to a mining concession 
29  One exploration concession is the size of 10 km2.  
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Law 18.097 passed. CORFO is a Chilean state institution for development, on account of its purpose, 
it was granted several lithium concessions by the Chilean state. CORFO gave concessions to SQM and 
SCL, which allow these companies to exploit and extract lithium in Chile. 
CODELCO, however, also owns salt-lakes that contain lithium. Considering that CODELCO 
is also a state-owned company, the copper giant is legally allowed to exploit and explore lithium. 
However, CODELCO has decided so far not to endeavour in the extraction and exploitation of 
lithium. CODELCO decided in August 2013 that it would shelve its plan to bring in international 
partners to develop its lithium reserve because it wanted to focus on other projects (Mining Lithium, 
August 2013).  The Chilean government created the Mining Code in 1971 and then modified this  
in 1983. The new 1983 Mining Code created new legislation wherein property rights were 
constitutionally defended and secured for foreign investors.  
The Chilean laws as they are now, are not unambiguously clear on the subject of lithium-
privatization. Rather, there is an obvious contradiction between constitutional and statutory provisions 
on the subject of lithium. First, the Constitution establishes that the state owns subsurface resources as 
a public good, while the Mining Code provides that mining concessions, once granted, are open-
ended; “Compensation in the event of revocation includes all potential future flows from exploitation 
of current reserves, which amounts to ownership” (ECLAC, 2014). This is, for example, why 
Rockwood Lithium has no end date to its concession (CORFO, 2014).  
As indicated earlier, lithium is considered a strategic resource in Chile, and thereby property 
of the state. However, that Chilean Constitution does not explicitly forbid the private activity on 
lithium this could be done, although always through a concession. This concession is a type of in rem 
right, meaning, among other things, that the private party having the concession has a right onto the 
concession, which is equal to the constitutional right to own private property, with all the legal, 
constitutional and international protection this involves.  
The concession, in this case, refers to who can explore and exploit the lithium, and therefore 
have a right to recompense for this activity. With a concession to private parties, these recompenses 
will go to private enterprises. The state will be forcing the company to pay a tax, fee, or royalty for the 
concession, or a part of the earnings this activity brings to the private party. When the state explores or 
exploits lithium, all earnings go to the public treasury.  
Thus although the Constitution does not forbid private activity on lithium, there are legislative 
and statutory provisions that do so. In Chile, as well as in many of the rest of Continental Legal 
Systems, these provisions are legally inferior to the Constitution, but more applicable and indeed they 
are the very first provisions to be applied in legal cases, or concessions in this case. That is the factual 
analysis, but that is not how it works in common practice, for constitutional provisions are too general 
and judges tend to avoid them as they reflect more philosophical and political principles rather than 
concrete legal rules to be applied in particular cases (Instituto Igualdad, 2012) 
Another law that is relevant to the analysis of the current Chilean mining industry came from 
an initiative of the military government, with the introduction of Decree Law 600 (DL 600); the 
‘Foreign Investment Statute’. This decree is a mechanism for the entry of capital into Chile (Foreign 
Investment Statute 1974) based on three principles (Mayorga & Mont, 1993): 
• Non-discriminatory treatment to foreign investors compared to national investors except 
in obtaining credits from national entities; 
• Free access to all sectors of the economy; 
• Minimum intervention by the authority on the investment activities.  
The DL 600 also created the Comité de Inversiones Extranjeras (Foreign Investment Committee) 
(CIE); this was to be the only agency responsible for the authorization and acceptation of the inflow of 
foreign capital. Once a contract is signed between an investor and the CIE has the same legal quality as 
contract law, meaning that it can only be changed by mutual agreement of the contracting parties (Foreign 
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Investment Statute 1974). There have been several adjustments to DL 600 over the years: by Law 19,207  
in 1993; by Law 20,026 in 2005; by Law 20,097 in 2006, and; by Law 20,469 in 2010 (Foreign Investment 
Statute 1974). These changes were mostly to improve efficiency towards foreign investors. The DL 600 
gives foreign investors legal security over their investments made in Chile.  
The military regime wanted to attract foreign investment in mining, not only by DL 600 and 
the constitutional protection to the right of private ownership of mines. There was also a fiscal regime 
for mining which included; (i) no royalty payments; (ii) low tax rates on profits; (iii) and, the 
possibility of reducing the tax burden even more through accelerated depreciation. FDI’s in the mining 
sector increased tremendously. From 1974 until 1989 there was a yearly average of US$ 90 million 
FDI’s. In 1990, this grew to US$ 803 million. From 1989 to 1995, the mining sector made up more 
than half of the FDI to Chile (Spilimbergo, 1999). This helps explain why Rockwood Lithium (SCL) 
does not have to pay royalties.  
2. Attempted lithium concession tender in 2012 
Chilean mining experts were afraid that the Chilean lithium industry would be underdeveloped 
compared to other lithium producing nations, because there were not enough incentives for mining 
companies to develop exploration because of the legal limitations (Santiago Times, 2011). A study by 
the Chilean Ministry of Mining estimated that there are more than 52 salt lakes with potential for 
lithium exploitation see Appendix 3.  
Former Chilean President Piñera announced in June 2012 that he had decided to privatize the 
Chilean lithium.  The idea was that any company could be granted rights to exploit lithium in Chile. 
The highest bidders would have to sign a Contrato Especial de Operación de Litio (CEOL) (Special 
Lithium Operating Contract). These CEOL’s would cover exploration and production of lithium, 
mostly in the country’s Atacama Desert with a permit to exploit up to 100 kMT Li during a period of 
20 years (website Chile Chamber).  
There was a lot of opposition towards the privatization of the mineral. Senator Isabel Allende, 
who was the president of the Senate’s Mining and Energy Committee in 2012, stated that most of the 
members in that Committee were of the opinion that lithium is a resource that should be dealt with by the 
state. Also the Federation of Unions and Professional Supervisors of CODELCO (FESUC) maintained 
that the state-owned copper company should lead the exploitation of lithium, so the resource stays under 
Chilean state control and not under control of private companies (Santiago Times, 2012). 
Despite the opposition, the concession was still tendered; in September 2012 SQM won the 
tender to develop a lithium concession in Chile. SQM reportedly presented a US$ 40,8 million offer 
for the 20 year concession. This was much higher than the bids from other important contenders.  
SQM was granted the right to mine up to 100 kMT of lithium over a period of 20 years. SQM would 
have to pay royalties to the Chilean government, which amounted to 7 per cent of the total output. 
After this tender, the Chilean public expressed its doubt about the fairness and transparency of 
the lithium concession tender. Julio Ponce presided the privatization-process. He was appointed to the 
board of SQM before it was privatized —by the military regime— and was also appointed president of 
the agency that supervised the privatization of many state-owned companies (Forbes, 2013).  
In 1987, Ponce became the president of the SQM. Ponce owned nearly 32 per cent of all the 
shares in SQM by 2013. The Chilean governmental regulatory institution for market price values 
(Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (SVS) accused Ponce of insider trading. Ponce —and three 
other SQM executives— allegedly carried out trades between subsidiary companies to the detriment 
of minority shareholders.  
The tender, won by SQM, was eventually nullified by the Comité Especial de Licitación 
(CEL) one week after the tender (Infolatam, 2012).  
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D. Concessions and fiscal regulation the Chilean 
lithium industry  
Although lithium is considered a strategic mineral in Chile —and therefore only exploitable by the 
state— lithium is not completely nationalized. Lithium in Chile is exploited and explored by private 
firms who were granted their concessions before lithium was declared a strategic mineral, or through a 
state institution;  
“Chemetall (Rockwood Holdings) and SQM have operated in what appears to be a favourable income 
tax environment but with rather different royalty frameworks. These have arisen in association with the 
particular circumstances surrounding the development of each project’ (Ebensberger et al., 2005).” 
1. Private firm: SCL & Rockwood holdings 
In 1969 the Chilean Institute for Geological Research30 studied the Salar de Atacama and indicated 
that it contained brines with interesting levels of lithium and other minerals. From 1974 until 1975, 
CORFO came to an agreement with Foote Minerals, from the USA. The two parties agreed to study 
the process and feasibility of lithium exploitation in Salar de Atacama. By 1980, CORFO and Foote 
Minerals signed a basic agreement for the development of the lithium project. The Sociedad Chilena 
del Litio (SCL)31
Between 1988 and 1989, CORFO sold its interests to Foote Minerals for US$ 15,2 million. 
SCL was later acquired by Cyprus Minerals, then by Chemetall, and finally by Rockwood Lithium. 
Since CORFO sold its shares in SCL between 1988 and 1989, the exploration and exploitation of 
lithium in Salar de Atacama has been a fully private endeavour (Evans, 2008). Rockwood Lithium has 
recently acquired a 49% share
 was created, owned for 55% by Foote Minerals and for 45 % by CORFO (CORFO, 
n.d.). In 1984, SCL started its operations in the Salar de Atacama, with a concession of approximately 
167 km2 (Rockwood Lithium, 2014).  
32
Albemarle, a chemical company from the USA, has recently bought Rockwood Lithium. 
Albemarle will own 70% of the combined concern, and Rockwood Lithium will own the remaining 
30% (Rockwood Specialties, 2014). 
 in the Talison Lithium Pty Ltd. the worlds leading spodumene 
producer, with mines in, among other countries, Australia (website Rockwood Lithium).   
2. Private firm: SQM 
In 1983, CORFO issued another tender, inviting bids for the exploration and exploitation of lithium in 
a territory of 819,2 km2, also in the Salar de Atacama. The concession went to the Ministerio de Salud 
(Ministry of Health, Chile / MINESAL), which contracted two private companies to exploit and 
explore lithium: AMAX with 25% and Molymet with 75%.  
SQM joined the endeavour to explore and exploitation spearheaded by the MINESAL in 
1993. In 1995, the involved parties changed the contract of the concession; CORFO withdrew and 
SQM acquired all of its shares. The renewed contract reaffirmed that nobody, not the CORFO nor any 
other party, can exploit resources in the rest of the Salar de Atacama not given in concession to either 
Rockwood Lithium or SQM a territory of approximately 1.470 km2.  
These rules apply until the end of the contract, which could last until the end of 2030 
depending on how much lithium SQM produces. The production limit for SQM is set at 180,1 kMT 
LCE; the contract expires if SQM produces this amount of lithium before 2030. Rockwood Lithium 
has a production limit of 200 kMT LCE, which officially ends at 2014 —but since Rockwood Lithium 
                                                                    
30  Instituto de Investigaciones Geológicas (IIG). 
31  The enterprise is currently a wholly owned subsidiary of the US-based Rockwood Lithium Inc. For a clear 
overview, the enterprise will be referred to simply as Rockwood Lithium in this document.  
32  The other 51% was bought the Chinese chemical company Tianqi which is further discussed in paragraph. 
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is the owner of the deposit, it can continue exploiting until all its minerals are exhausted 
(SERNAGEOMIN, 2014). SQM has approximately produced 82 kMT LCE of its 180,1 kMT LCE 
limit— and Rockwood Holdings has produced 74 kMT LCE of its 200 kMT LCE limit.  
In the case of SQM, the rights of the lithium mineral are still owned by CORFO, but leased to 
the mining company. In the case of Rockwood Holdings, CORFO sold all its rights including the rights 
to mine 200 kMT LCE free of royalty payments. Rockwood Lithium is the sole owner of its lithium-
deposits. The two lithium-producing companies now lease and own a total surface of 986,2 km2 where 
they can exploit lithium, plus a buffer zone between the tenders of SQM and Rockwood Lithium of  
100 km2 which separates the two (SQM, 2013a; Le Monde Diplomatique; Gruber & Medina, 2010).  
Appendix 2 shows the Salar de Atacama, and the concessions of SQM and Rockwood Holding.  
3. Fiscal regulation 
Table 16 shows the fiscal regulation for the two lithium-producing companies in Chile.  
Table 16 
Fiscal regulations on Lithium in Chile 
Company SQM Rockwood Lithium (SCL) 
Lithium Royalty1 6.8% Royalty free 
Quarterly fixed rental 
obligations (in US$) 
3.750 (15.000 per 
year) Free of payment 
Expiration of exploitation 
contracts or agreements 
Until SQM has 
exploited ~960 kMT 
LCE.  
Or, until 2030. 
Until Rockwood Lithium has exploited ~1.065 kMT LCE. Initial term was 
for 30 years, but the term has been renewable for 5 successive years until it 
has fulfilled its exploitation goals. 
Top rate of Corporate 
Income Tax (CIT) 
20% 
Level at which CIT 
is applied 
Federal 
CIT deductions allowed 
for 
Depreciation of ores, buildings, and machinery allowed over the  
lifetime of the mine, with no limit of tax %. 
Import taxes. 
Concession granted by CORFO 
National concession 
status 
Lithium has been non-concessible after Mining Code of 1983: Law 18.097. Lithium in Chile is a 
strategic mineral of national interest.  
Ownership of lithium Chilean state (regulated by Nuclear Energy Commission).  
Mining Taxes not applicable to lithium concessions  
—of SQM and Rockwood Lithium (SCL)— 
Specific Mining Tax 
(royalty) 
Introduced in 2006, paid by mining companies depending on their production and based on operating 
margins, which are sales minus direct costs and expenses. 
Mining Patent  
(protection regime) 
Mining firms are obligated to pay an annual mining patent, in order to keep the mining concession. 
Patent rates vary, but for an exploration concession it is generally ~US$160 per km2, and ~US$800 per 
km2 for exploitation concessions.   
Source: Constructed by the authors from:  CORFO, 2014; KPMG; NSI, 2013; Organic Constitutional Law on Mining 
Concessions 1982. 
1 Royalties on Lithium Carbonate Li2CO3; Lithium Hydroxyde LiOH, and Lithium Brines. 
The royalty payments to be made to CORFO by SQM in Chile are based on its quarterly 
corporate sales.  However, since lithium is non-concessible, the production of lithium is not affected by 
specific mining taxes, such as the annual fee for the Mining Patent that Chile employs for other minerals 
(COCHILCO, 2013: 42). Nevertheless, since lithium is a non-concessible strategic mineral, SQM and 
Rockwood Holdings are not obligated to pay this mining patent.  
Would lithium, however, become a concessible mineral, then lithium producers would also have 
to pay this mining patent. This tax is levied, progressively, on operational income obtained by the 
mineral exploiter from mining activities (KPMG, 2014).    
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4. Redistribution of collected REI revenue in Chile 
In Chile almost all taxes are paid to the central government, and none of these revenues are set aside 
for redistribution back to the regions containing the mines and its communities. The exception is the 
Mining Patent; this fee is paid to the region containing the mine, in order to protect the mining title. 
The spending of collected revenue from REI’s, however, is subject to the government’s general 
resource allocation strategies and public financial management principles. This means that mineral 
revenues reach mining regions and mining communities only via general expenditure allocations 
approved in the annual budget process.  
A case study on the sustainable development through the Chilean REI, done by the ICMM (2007), 
concluded that for a mining region to benefit from mining, they do not necessarily require revenue 
distribution. The main mining region in Chile is the Second region of Antofagasta. This region has 
experienced faster economic growth and poverty reduction than the rest of Chile, because of the rapid 
mining expansion in the region.  
The Chilean case study showed that there were —unusually— strong linkages between the 
mining sector and other economic sectors of the local economy. The local economic growth, on 
account of the mineral-industry, is also partly explained by the relatively effective management of 
public finances. Chile’s relatively strong institutions have been effectively used tax revenues in order 
to further social development. (ICMM, 2007; ICMM, 2009).  
5. State agencies in the chilean lithium industry 
The Chilean state has claims of territory in Pedernales, Aguilar and Maricunga, through CODELCO, 
CORFO, and ENAMI. The state has only 0.8% of the total mining exploration concessions of the 
lithium containing salares, because it only has exploration concessions in Pedernales. The total 
granted exploitation concessions33
• CORFO controls 36.3% of the mining property and covers 54.6% of the surface of the 
Salar de Atacama; 
 amount to 34.4% of the lithium containing salares, which means 
that 65.5% is theoretically still concessible. However, as salares are often home to more natural 
resources, territories containing lithium have in some cases already been given in concession to 
companies mining for other natural resources.  
• ENAMI holds 3% of the concessions in the Salar de Aguilar, and; 
• CODELCO has 100% and 18% of the concessions in the salt mines of Pedernales and 
Maricunga, respectively. 
CODELCO has, according to its own calculations, of 56 kMT of lithium resources in 
Maricunga, and 21 kMT of lithium resources in Pedernales. The Chilean state, all in all, owns 51.8% 
of the surface of the given concessions of lithium exploitation (SERNAGEOMIN, 2014). The Chilean 
state has, therefore, a considerable amount of claims to lithium concessions, which means that the 
state has a potential for significant lithium production would it chose to do so.  
E. Added value in the lithium industry 
Chile has thus far not exported lithium batteries, or added significant value in the lithium industry. 
Rockwood Lithium is producing batteries in the USA and Germany, but has not done so in Chile 
(COCHILCO, 2013). Rockwood Lithium is however, planning to create a facility in Chile in which 
lithium can be processed to basic inputs for electronic vehicles (El Mercurio, 2014). COCHILCO (2013) 
has estimated that the Chilean lithium industry has contributed US$ 3,6 billion to the domestic 
economy through the total lithium production since 1984 until 2012.  
                                                                    
33  Under the Mining Code of 1932. 
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VI. The national lithium commission 
A. The policy proposal 
The Chilean National Lithium Commission (NLC) stated in its final Policy Proposal (Ministerio de 
Minería, 2014) that lithium in Chile should remain a strategic mineral because of the potential of 
lithium in electric appliances. The NLC, therefore, recommends keeping lithium non-concessible. The 
NLC also finds that the state should maintain exclusive ownership of these resources, while defining 
the terms and rules of its exploitation.  
The NLC recommends the state to focus on the long-term development, in order to fully 
capture the economic resource rents. Long-term benefits in the case of lithium should come through 
the development of science, and the integration of the production-chain; as to add value in the 
production-chain by processing and manufacturing lithium-related products. The NLC therefore 
recommends encouraging public-private partnerships (PPP).   
The NLC found that the Chilean state has been lacking in its regulation and control with 
regard to natural resources such as lithium, which has made it difficult for the state to develop 
economically through the sustainable exploitation of these resources. The NLC proposes to treat the 
lithium industry as part of an integrated system of salar-management, meaning that the exploitation of 
lithium should not be governed independent of its environment —the salares—. This involves 
assessments of negative environmental externalities, but also dealing with the local inhabitants.  
The NLC proposes to this end the incorporation of the concept ‘shared value’. To achieve 
this, the NLC proposes a public institution, which would act as a counterpart to the enterprises that are 
exploiting minerals in the salares. This institution would then define an integrated methodological 
framework that will ensure the Chilean state of the best form of exploitation and management of its 
salares. This methodological framework would equip the Chilean state with sound regulatory and 
fiscal capacity. The benefits hereof would be in its long-term goals; from the exploration of the 
salares, to the exportation of raw materials or further processed products aimed at promoting 
knowledge creation and new uses for lithium.  
The NLC has analyzed various administrative forms this public institution could take; from 
the reforming of existing public institutions, to the creation of a new institution. The NLC also 
proposes the creation of an Enterprise, controlled by the state, dedicated to the exploitation of valuable 
minerals of the salares —especially lithium—. The NLC proposes to use a PPP business-model, 
incorporating the shared-value principle. This public-private structure could be achieved through the 
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creation of a new public enterprise or a state corporation, or as a subsidiary or affiliate of existing 
state-owned mining companies. The NLC believes that the state participates in the exploitation of 
lithium through this new enterprise, as a supervisor of all he projects 
Because of the complexity and diversity of the possible current and future applications of 
lithium, the NLC implores the Chilean government to incentivize research and development for 
technologies regarding lithium extraction and its various uses. The NLC stresses the development of 
production-processes for lithium carbonate, such as the production of batteries and other energy 
accumulating salts. Research and development, for the NLC, would be aided by creating and 
strengthening a sectorial cluster linked to lithium, which will strengthen the research and innovation 
centers associated with universities and the industry, as well as PPP for the exploitation of lithium. 
The NLC finds a concrete example of the need for linking research with industry is the huge potential 
for Chile in generating solar energy.  
The NLC recommends CORFO to look over, and perhaps revise, its existing contracts in 
Salar de Atacama —with SQM and Rockwood— giving the state a more active role. The NLC also 
recommends CORFO not to renew or extend the exploitation permits at the same low terms.  
B. Concluding remarks 
This report has shown that a mineral-rich state faces various challenges in choosing an exploitation-
policy and a developmental strategy. Especially when it comes to sharing the resource rent, the level 
and manner of state-involvement directly influences economic growth and development. In the case of 
Chile and lithium, it has yet to be decided what kind of fiscal regime the Chilean government will 
implement; although it is clear that the state wants to be directly involved in the exploitation process 
albeit as a supervisor. When a state creates PPP’s it can choose to levy taxes based on production or 
value as described earlier a state can also create special operating contracts.  
It is clear that the NLC recommends the state to create an institution that governs the 
regulation and fiscal policy of the Chilean salares. It is, however, yet to be seen precisely which 
approach the Chilean state will take towards its fiscal policy and to what extent the current 
Government will fully adopt the NLC’s recommendations. In its endeavor to find a suitable approach, 
it is wise to remember the scale of the lithium industry. As indicated in this report, the export of raw 
lithium is relatively small especially when compared to a huge Chilean industry as that of copper.  
The lithium-industry is valuable for its technological applications such as in energy storage. The 
NLC therefore aptly recommends the promotion of research and development and cooperation with the 
private sector, in order to develop an industry that goes beyond the simple exportation of raw lithium. 
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Annex 2 
Lithium battery grade and price (Fox-Davies Resources 




Map of Atacama showing location variations in concentration 
of lithium in the brine and the ponds and wells of SQM 
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List of acronyms and abbreviations  
CEOL  Contratos Especiales de Operación de Litio (Special Lithium 
Operating Contract) 
CEOP  Contratos Especiales de Operaciones de Petróleo (Special 
Petroleum Operations Contracts) 
CEPAL  Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Spanish 
acronym for: ECLAC) 
CIT Corporate Income Tax 
COCHILCO  Comisión Chilena del Cobre (Chilean Copper Commission) 
CODELCO  Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (National Copper 
Corporation of Chile) 
COMIBOL Corporación Minera de Bolivia (Bolivian Mining Corporation) 
CORFO Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (Production 
Development Corporation) 
ECLAC  Economic Commission for Latin America & the Caribbean (English 
acronym for: CEPAL) 
EITI The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 
ENAMI Empresa Nacional de Minería (National Mining Company) 
FMC Food Machinery Corporation 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GNRE Gerencia Nacional de Recursos Evaporíticos (National 
Management Committee for Evaporitic Resources)  
ICMM International Council on Mining & Metals 
ICTD International Centre for Tax and Development 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
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JORC Joint Ore Reserves Committee 
Km2 Square kilometer 
kMT Kilo metric ton 
kMTpa Kilo metric tones per annum 
LCE Lithium Carbonate Equivalent 
Li Lithium 
Mg/l Milligrams per liter 
N.D. Not dated 
NLC National Lithium Commission 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PPS Public-private partnerships 
PSA Production Sharing Agreement 
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers 
RA Resource Availability 
RE Resource Extraction 
REI Resource Extractive Industry 
SA Service Agreement 
SCL Sociedad Chileno del Litio (Chilean Lithum Society)  
SEMinería Secretaría de Estado de Minería (Argentina) (Ministry of Mining) 
SERNAGEOMIN  Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería (National Geology and 
Mining Service) 
SQM Sociedad Química y Minera (Chemical and Mining Society) 
T Ton 
Tpa Tons per annum 
US$ Currency in United States of America (Dollar) 
USGS United States Geological Survey  

